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ABSTRACT 
Enterprises in a tourism supply chain usually adopt and operate two business strategies: 
maximizing their profits or their revenues. This paper investigates the conditions on which these 
strategies allow enterprises to achieve the maximum benefits in the context of entire supply chain. 
Several managerial implications have been derived from this theoretical research. Firstly, theme 
park operator, tour operators and hotel & accommodation providers obtain larger market shares 
and profits if they select the revenue maximization (R) strategy. Secondly, the profit maximization 
(P) strategy is a better strategy for both sectors when all the tour operators and all hotel & 
accommodation providers choose the same strategy. Finally, if both sectors could freely choose 
their strategies, there is market equilibrium where P-strategy and R-strategy could coexist. 
INTRODUCTION 
Tourism and hospitality industries have enjoyed rapid developments in recent years. This is 
particularly true in emerging economies in the greater China region, including Hong Kong. A 
number of tourism and shopping destinations have been upgraded and launched in Hong Kong. 
These features are particularly attractive to tourists from the mainland China, in addition to those 
from the rest of the region and those from the West. Tour operators are providing package 
holiday products consisting of core components such as theme park (e.g. DisneylandHK or 
OceanPark), and shopping experiences in Time Square, Pacific Places, etc. As a result, a 
complex supply chain has already developed in Hong Kong tourism and hospitality industry. 
Package holidays are tourist programs that are purposefully configured out of a variety of 
tourist activities. Tourist attractions (man-made, natural, cultural or social), accommodation, 
transportation, and dining and shopping experiences are typical core tourist components of the 
package holiday products. Different types of tourist components (activities) in package holidays 
are provided by specialist agents and enterprises that form tourism supply chain. A typical 
tourism supply chain (TSC) comprises the suppliers of all the goods and services that go into the 
delivery of tourism products to consumers (Richard and Xavier). 
There has been a rich literature on the behavioral view of enterprises on the periphery of 
mainstream economic thought. Perhaps the most important assumption is that enterprise is to 
maximize profits strategically according to the classical formulation (Hirshleifer 1980). However, 
this pure profit maximizing strategy behavior has been criticized by many economists, such as 
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 Baumol (1967) and Nicholson (1995). They argued that the enterprise try to maximize sales may 
be reasonable for assuring their long-term survival. 
Enterprises in Tourism and Hospitality industry have also practiced the different strategies 
of maximizing profits or revenues (Collins and Parsa 2006). The profit maximizing tourism 
enterprise may compete in mature tourism market, have certain market share, and gain high 
reputation for tourists. Moreover, it could be controlled by owners who expect continuously 
profit and steady growth. Contrastively, the revenue maximizing enterprise may be in its fast 
growth period or enjoin rapid development of tourist market. More tourists come forth, 
enterprise-size be rapidly expanded. Managers eager to introduce new products, gain market 
share, build up reputation, and achieve return to scale. Furthermore, the management is more 
interest its own income and prestige which depend, sometimes, on its sales rather than profit 
(Yakov and Jacob, 1979). Generally, both profit maximization and revenue maximization could 
be the strategic goals of tourism enterprises, but only one dominates, such as maximizing its 
revenues subject to a minimum profit constraint. Moreover, enterprises may or may not change 
their strategies along with protean internal or external environment. 
This paper aims to investigate strategy choices of enterprises in Hong Kong TSC for 
package holidays. The TSC has two layers or echelons structure. In the upstream layer, there are 
multiple hotel & accommodation providers and a theme park. They provide serves and 
experiences for the downstream for configuration. A number of tour operators in the downstream 
layer are responsible for configuring and packing the holidays, then sale them to target tourists as 
a whole. The price of package holidays charged by tourists contains the payment for 
accommodation and the ticket of the theme park. 
In this paper, two strategies of enterprises are considered: profit maximizing strategy and 
revenues maximizing strategy. In TSC, each tour operator or hotel & accommodation provider 
freely makes its own strategy decision. Because there is only one theme park operator, we 
assume it is a profit-maximizer. We are interested in the following questions:  
(1)  What impacts the strategies of maximizing profits and revenues would have on the tour 
operators, hotel & accommodation providers and theme pack operator respectively?  
(2)  Which strategy is most beneficial to individual enterprises, the sectors, and the entire TSC 
and what are the conditions?  
(3)  Could individual enterprises practice different strategies in the supply chain and what are 
the conditions for such co-existence?  
 
In order to address these research questions, this paper proposes a multi-stage game 
framework. The theme park operator determines its ticket price. After choosing their strategies, 
hotel & accommodation providers compete with each other, and the quantity competition 
determines a market equilibrium price. After learning the prices from the upstream, tour 
operators decide their strategies, then the equilibrium price for package holidays are reached 
through quantity competition. The multi-stage game is solved in bottom-up fashion. Given the 
demand faced by the tour operators, each of them simultaneously determines the number of 
tourists they served so as to maximize profits or revenues. Aggregating the equilibrium quantities 
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 of tourists for all the tour operators gives the best response function for hotel & accommodation 
providers and the theme park operator as demand curves. Using the same logic for the hotel & 
accommodation providers, and combining the result from the theme park, the final equilibriums 
have been obtained. 
Game theory has not been widely used in tourism and hospitality literature. Only very 
limited pioneering efforts can be found in this area. Taylor (1998) introduced a game matrix 
analyzed tour operator’s mixed price strategy. Chung (2000) examined pricing strategies and 
business performances of super deluxe hotels in Seoul by modified prisoner’s dilemma game 
model. Wie (2003) formulated a dynamic game model of strategic capacity investment in cruise 
line industry. Bastakis, Buhalis, and Butler (2004) presented a bargaining game with asymmetric 
information to analyze relationships between tour operator and small and medium sized tourism 
accommodation enterprises. Recently, Garcia and Tugores (2006) proposed a two-stage duopoly 
game model in which hotels competed in both quality and price. The most of above literatures 
focus on single tourism enterprise or sector. This differs from our scenario which is in TSC for 
package holidays. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model and the 
equilibrium solution. Section 3 discusses the strategy choices of enterprises in TSC in different 
situations. Section 4 presents a number of useful managerial implications derived from 
theoretical results, and identifies the directions for future work. It should be noted that proofs of 
theorems with more mathematical background are omitted in order to save space. 
Theme
Pack
Tourism 
Operator
TSC
Hotel & 
Accommodation
provider
Profit Maximization Revenue Maximization  
Figure 1. Tourism Supply Chain under study.  
METHOD 
The TSC for package holidays includes three sectors, namely tour operator (TO), hotel & 
accommodation provider (HA), and theme park operator (TP). There is only one TP while 
multiple TOs and HAs in the TSC. TP provides key activity for tourists to visit, and HAs supply 
accommodation for tourists. TOs are responsible for packaging the holidays to tourists including 
the options from the TP and HAs. For the sake of simplicity, we assume that all the tourists join 
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 the package holidays. This means that tourists do not obtain tickets directly from the TP operator. 
Those who obtain tickets directly from the TP operator do not require HA and therefore are not 
included for consideration in our model. TOs and HAs are grouped into sectors and entities 
within a sector are homogeneous. The two-echelon structure can be represented as a tree with 
each sector represented as a node (see figure 1).  
Each TO/HA in TSC has two strategies: profit maximizing strategy (P-strategy) and 
revenue maximizing strategy (R-strategy). Enterprises in TSC play a two-stage game: 
Stage 1: TP chooses the ticket price, and each HA determines his marketing strategy and optimal 
service quantities according to his strategy through competition. 
Stage 2: Each TO obtains the decision made by TP and HAs and then determines his marketing 
strategy and quantity of package holidays sold simultaneously through competition. 
 
In the mathematical formulation, there are N TOs and M HAs in the TSC, indexed by 
1...i N=  and 1...j M= . The subscript (P and R) is used to distinguish the entities in TSC using 
different marketing strategies. For example, RTO  is a set of TOs who take R-strategy, RN  is 
the number of RTO  and RR
Nn
N
=  is market ratio in TO sector. The strategy sets of TOs and 
HAs are denoted by ( , )i iX X X −=  and ( , )j jY Y Y−=  in space { , }
NP R  and { , }MP R  
respectively, where 1...i N= , 1...j M= . iX −  and jY−  represent strategy sets of TOs and HAs 
excluding iTO  and jHA . Unit cost of TH, HA, and TO are c, 2c  and 1c , while price of TH, HA, 
and TO are p, 2p  and 1p . Without loss of generality, we assume a linear inverse price function 
for jTO  is 1
jp Qα β= − . Linear price function is broadly used in manufacture supply chain 
(Carr and Karmarkar 2005; Xiao and Yu 2006), also applied in tourism and hospitality literatures 
(Zheng 1997; Wie 2005). The parameter α  presents the market scale and 1 2c c cα > + + . β  is 
quantity-sensitivity that means increment of quantities tourists leads to decrement of price for 
competition. 
Tourism Operator’s Model 
The profit function of jTO  is 1 1 1 2 1( )
j j j jq p p p cπ = − − − , and the revenue function of jTO  
is 1 1 1 2( )
j j jR q p p p= − − , where 1
jc  is unit cost of jTO . Take the first and second derivations 
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 respective to 1
jq , we get the optimal quantities: 
2 1
1
1
2
1
1 ,   
2 2
1 ,         
2 2
j
i
Pi j
j
i
Ri j
p p c q j TO
q
p p q j TO
α
β
α
β
≠
≠
⎧ − − −
− ∈⎪⎪
= ⎨
− −⎪
− ∈⎪⎩
∑
∑
 
Sum up quantities for all the TOs, the total number of tourists is: 
2 1( )
( 1)
P Pp p n c NQ
N
α
β
− − −
=
+
, where 
1
1
P
j
j TO
P
P
c
c
N
∈
=
∑
                      (1) 
Hotel & Accommodation Provider’s Model 
From equation (1), a demand curve for HAs is 2 2 1
( 1)
P
Q Np p n c
N
β
α
+
= − − − . Applying 
the same logic as that for TOs, the profit function and the revenue function for jHA  are 
2 2 2 2( )
j j jq p cπ = −  and 2 2 2
j jq pπ =  respectively, where 2
jc  is unit cost of jHA . If following 
quantities are decided, HAs have no incentive to deviate those selections. 
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Sum up quantities for all the HAs, the total number of tourists is 
1 2( )
( 1)( 1)
P P P PMN p n c m cQ
M N
α
β
− − −
=
+ +
, where 
2
2
P
j
j HA
P
p
c
c
M
∈
=
∑
                 (2) 
Theme Park Operator’s Model 
From equation (1), TP ticket price is 2 1
( 1)
P P
Q Np p n c
N
β
α
+
= − − − . TP maximizes its 
profit 3 ( )Q p cπ = − , and get the optimal tourists quantity: 
2 1( )
2 ( 1)
P PN p n c cQ
N
α
β
− − −
=
+
                                          (3) 
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 Model Equilibriums 
Combining (2) and (3), following equilibriums are obtained: 
for TP:     1 2( )
(2 1)( 1)
P P P PNM c n c m cQ
M N
α
β
− − −
=
+ +
;
2 2
1 2
3 2
( )
(2 1) ( 1)
P P P PM N c n c m c
M N
α
π β
− − −
=
+ +
. 
for Pj TO∈ : 1 11
j
jP P Pn c cQq
N β
−
= + ,
2
2 1 1
1 1 1
( )2( ) ( )
j
jP j P P
P P
n c cQ Q n c c
N N
π β β
−
= + − + . 
for Rj TO∈ : 11
jR P Pn cQq
N β= + ,
2 1
1 1 1 1 1( ) (2 ) ( )
jR j jP P
P P P P
n cQ Q n c c n c c
N N
π β β= + − + − . 
for Pj HA∈ : 2 22
( )
( 1)
j
jP P PN m c cQq
M Nβ
−
= +
+
, 
2
2 2 2
2 2 2
( )( 1) 2( ) ( )
( 1)
j
jP j P P
P P
N m c cN Q Q m c c
N M M N
β
π β
−+
= + − +
+
. 
for Rj HA∈ : 22 ( 1)
jR P PNm cQq
M Nβ= + + , 
2 2
2 2 2 2 2
( 1) ( ) (2 ) ( )
( 1)
jR j jP P
P P P P
Nm cN Q Q m c c m c c
N M M N
β
π β
+
= + − + −
+
. 
Following definition is used throughout the rest of paper. 
DEFINITION 1. Given other HAs’ (TOs’) strategies, if * * *1 1( , ) ( , )i i i i i iX X X Xπ π− −≤  
( * * *2 2( , ) ( , )j j j j j jY Y Y Yπ π− −≤ ) for 1...i N∀ =  ( 1...j M∀ = ), then * *( , )i iX X −  ( * *( , )j jY Y− ) is 
the TO (HA) Nash Equilibrium, and *Pn  (
*
Pm ) is Equilibrium Market Ratio. 
The definition means that if a TO or a HA is in the Nash equilibrium he has no incentive to 
unilaterally change his strategy. In other words, equilibrium strategy is his optimal choice given 
others’ strategies, so that any change would lead he to earn less than if he remained with his 
current strategy. For simplicity, we assume that all TOs or HAs are identical. 
FINDINGS 
Based on the above equilibriums, we first identify the impact of different strategy choices on 
TOs, HAs and TP’s performances. The results are presented as follows: 
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 PROPOSITION 1. (1) Output shares and profits of TOs or HAs who choose R-strategy 
is greater than those choose P-strategy; (2) TP is benefit from the R-strategy taken by TOs 
and HAs. 
Then a simple scenario is discussed in which all the enterprises in the same sector using the 
same strategy. This is considered as all the TOs and HAs join their sector associations, so that 
they keep their decisions consistently through coordination. Four instances are considered, which 
are (1) all the TOs and HAs choose the P-strategy; (2) all the TOs choose the P-strategy and all 
the HAs choose the R-strategy; (3) all the TOs choose the R-strategy and all the HAs choose the 
P-strategy; (4) all the TOs and HAs choose the R-strategy. The profits of TOs or HAs in different 
instances are easily extended from the result of previous section and listed as follows, as well as 
the game matrix structure shown in Table 1. 
Table 1. Game Matrix. 
HA  
P-Strategy R-Strategy  
P-Strategy ( 1
PPπ , 2
PPπ ) ( 1
PRπ , 2
PRπ ) 
TO 
R-Strategy ( 1
RPπ , 2
RPπ ) ( 1
RRπ , 2
RRπ ) 
 
2 2
1 2
1 2 2
( )
(2 1) ( 1)
PP M c c c
M N
α
π β
− − −
=
+ +
;
2
1 2
2 2
( )
(2 1) ( 1)
PP N c c c
M N
α
π β
− − −
=
+ +
; 
2 2
1 1
( ) ( )[ ]
(2 1)( 1) (2 1)( 1)
RP M c c M c cc
M N M N
α α
π β
− − − −
= −
+ + + +
;
2
2
2 2
( )
(2 1) ( 1)
RP N c c
M N
α
π β
− −
=
+ +
; 
2 2
1
1 2 2
( )
(2 1) ( 1)
PR M c c
M N
α
π β
− −
=
+ +
; 1 12 2
( )( )
2 1 (2 1)( 1)
PR c c N c cc
M M N
α α
π β
− − − −
= −
+ + +
; 
1 1
( ) ( )[ ]
(2 1)( 1) (2 1)( 1)
RR M c M cc
M N M N
α α
π β
− −
= −
+ + + +
; 2 2
( )( )
2 1 (2 1)( 1)
RR c N cc
M M N
α α
π β
− −
= −
+ + +
. 
 
LEMMA 1. 1 1 1
PR RR RPπ π π> > , 1 1 1
PR PP RPπ π π> > , 2 2 2
RP RR PRπ π π> > , 2 2 2
RP PP PRπ π π> > . 
THEOREM 1. All the TOs and HAs choosing the P-strategy is the unique Nash 
Equilibrium of the above game matrix. 
Consequently, we investigate in a common scenario where TOs and HAs freely choose 
their strategies. Following theorem gives the sufficient and necessary condition of Nash 
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 Equilibrium in TO sector: 
THEOREM 2. The sufficient and necessary condition for * *( , )i iX X −  to be Nash 
Equilibrium in TO sector is Equilibrium Market Ratio *Pn  satisfy:
* [ , ] [0,1]P P Pn n n
− +∈ I , 
where 
2
1
( )1 1
1 ( 2 2 ) (1 )
P P
p
c m c kkn
k N N k c k
α
−
− −−
= + −
− − + −
, 
2
1
( )1 ( 1 )
1 ( 2 2 ) (1 )
P P
p
c m c kN kn
k N N k c k
α+ − −− +
= + −
− − + −
, and
(2 1)( 1)
Mk
M N
=
+ +
. 
Similar to Theorem 2, theorem about HA sector is shown as follows: 
THEOREM 3. The sufficient and necessary condition for * *( , )j jY Y−  to be Nash 
Equilibrium in HA sector is Equilibrium Market Ratio *Pm  satisfy:
* [ , ] [0,1]P P Pm m m
− +∈ I , 
where 
1
2
1 21
2 (2 3) 2
P P
p
c n cm
M M M Mc
α
−
− −
= + + −
−
 
1
2
1 2 11
2 (2 3) 2
P P
p
c n cMm
M M M Mc
α+ − −−
= + + −
−
. 
Sometime, the TO sector and HA sector have the large number of enterprises. For example, 
a great number of tour operators in Mainland China run the business with tour to Disney HK, and 
there are plenty of hotels serving tourists in Hong Kong. In this condition, the corollary shows 
our finding: 
COROLLARY 1. All the TOs and HAs choose P-strategy when conditions N → ∞  and 
M → ∞  are hold. 
This corollary is intuitive, as [ , ]P Pm m
− +  and [ , ]P Pn n
− +  converge to 1 when N and M 
become infinite. It presents the perfect competition market in which price is equal to unit cost 
and all the TOs and HAs are unprofitable. 
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 Previous analyses in this sector are in behavior of tourism enterprise. However, as is 
common in the industrial organization literature, social planer cares about the sector welfare or 
total sector plus (Garcia and Tugores 2006). Welfare function or total sector surplus is defined as 
the sum of profits of all enterprises in the sector. 
The TO sector’s surplus is: 1 1
P R
TO p RN Nπ πΠ = +  
The HA sector’s surplus is: 2 2
P R
HA P RM Mπ πΠ = +  
Maximizing the sector’s surplus, one can easy get the following proposition: 
PROPOSITION 2. P strategy is the optimal choice for TO sector and HA sector. 
Similar to the definition of sector welfare, the supply chain welfare or supply chain plus 
is 3Chian TO HA πΠ = Π + Π + . The following proposition gives the optimal strategy choices when the 
supply chain welfare is maximal. 
PROPOSITION 3. In the context of entire supply chain, the optimal strategy choices of 
TOs ( Pn ) and HAs ( Pm ) satisfy 1 2
1 2
(2 1)( 1)
2
P Pc n c m c M N
c c c MN
α
α
− − − + +
=
− − −
. 
APPLICATION OF RESULTS AND FUTURE WORK 
Several managerial implications have been derived from this theoretical research. Firstly, 
tour operators and hotel & accommodation providers who select the revenue maximization (R) 
strategy get the larger market share and profit compared to the situation where the profit 
maximization (P) strategy is adopted. TP also prefers R-strategy to P-strategy for more tourism 
visitors. Secondly, if all the tour operators or hotel & accommodation providers synchronously 
choose the same strategy, P strategy is a better strategy for both of these sectors. Thirdly, when 
tour operators or hotel & accommodation providers could freely choose their strategies, there is 
market equilibrium where P-strategy and R-strategy could coexist. Finally, in view of individual 
sectors, one of the sectors, either tour operators or hotel & accommodation providers, is expected 
to take the P-strategy. In the context of entire supply chain, the condition in which supply chain 
welfare is maximal is also presented. 
The further research can be extended in two possible directions. We have assumed the 
quantity competition between tour operators and hotel & accommodation providers, an 
alternative model would be to replace the quantity competition by a price competition where the 
enterprises choose equilibrium prices rather than quantities. Comparative analysis would yield 
more different and interesting results. We would investigate strategy choice in a more realistic 
market structure. Tour operator and hotel & accommodation sectors are dominated by few large 
leader enterprises. Other enterprises are small and compete as followers. It would be interesting 
to discuss the different impact of strategy choices between leader and follower enterprises.  
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